Purpose -To examine the impact of the merger of the two largest US department store companies on the competitive state of the sector and specifically the anti-trust implications of the consolidation.
of Commerce terms 'conventional and chain department store' sales in the USA, and a significantly higher share of the more tightly defined traditional department store sector. In turn, this acquisition is part of the broader ripple effects that have spread throughout the industry as the sector has consistently lost share of total retail sales, with sixth ranked firm Neiman Marcus agreeing to a $5.1bill acquisition by private equity groups Texas Pacific and Warburg Pincus, and fourth ranked firm Saks Inc announcing a splitting and partial sale of its business.
The Federated/May merger represents a further seismic shift within an industry that has experienced constant restructuring over the past two decades. Initially this was seen in the leveraged buy-out phenomenon of the late 1980s which ultimately led to the leading department store companies of the time filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection -notably Macys; Allied Stores; Carter Hawley Hale and Federated (Hallsworth, 1991; Wood, 2001 ). There then followed, during the 1990s, a period of strategic portfolio restructuring whereby regional department store chains were acquired by newly emerging conglomerates (Wood, 2002a) . In turn this was accompanied by an intense period of cost cutting and organisational restructuring in order to attain the synergistic benefits that had been used to justify the consolidations (Wood, 2002b) . The latest shifts in the industry, in one sense, merely take the logic of that organizational restructuring further. However they also raise a number of important issues which have wider implications for conceptual debate concerning merger & acquisition activity in retailing.
In particular, the consolidation raises significant questions about US antitrust regulation. The main issue is whether the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was correct to adopt a laissez-faire stance in allowing the transaction to proceed, leaving State Attorney Generals to rule only on local divestment of stores in some catchments thereby protecting competitive conditions. Clearly, the regulatory agency adopted the view that the transaction represented a 'defensive merger' given that the sector has been struggling because of strong competition from both discount operators (e.g.
Wal-Mart, Target) and speciality apparel stores.
While the merger was allowed to proceed by the FTC, a significant degree of local-market divestiture results -75 stores in 72 malls -of which 47 were made to satisfy regulators. As a result, it is important to interrogate how that geography of store disposal will alter the competitive landscape of the industry -giving a foothold to operators currently outside market leadership positions. Analysis indicates that operators such as Nordstrom, JC Penney, Neiman Marcus and Sears are likely to be the main beneficiaries of any divestiture, gaining footholds in markets in which they are currently under-represented.
In addition, it is also important to understand the broader implications of a merger that creates a 950 store/$30bill sales company will have on the suppliers of that firm. This is particularly the case in the context of the debates which have recently taken place in the UK concerning 'market power' and 'codes of practice' relating to retailers dealings with suppliers, following the Competition Commission's inquiry into the supermarket sector in 2000 and its rulings in the case of the takeover of Safeway in 2003 (Wrigley, 2001 , Burt and Sparks, 2003 .
Finally, the consolidation will drive another wave of organisational restructuring for these firms -a restructuring which is likely to see the Federated approach to merchandising, widely regarded to be more sophisticated than May's, being applied to the acquired stores with a subsequent slimming of the supplier base. The issue here is how this restructuring will rework the tension between national control that generates efficiencies and economies of scale, and local execution which demands sensitivity to local cultures of consumption (Wood, 2002b) .
Background to the Merger

Historical perspective
Since the 1930s there has been consistent and regular forecasts of the imminent demise of the traditional department store in the US (see Nystrom, 1930 for an early example). While the sector has steadily lost market share throughout the post war period, this deterioration was more marked during the 1990s when the format was essentially pressured from both ends of the quality/value spectrum. In particular, apparel was increasingly merchandised across a wider range of valuefocused retailers with discount department stores such as Kohl's and "big box" operators such as Wal-Mart and Target experiencing significant growth (see Figure 1 for a comparison of traditional and discount department store performance), whilst both middle market apparel specialists (e.g.
Gap, The Limited) and fashion designer retailers (e.g. Prada, Gucci, etc -see Moore et al 2000) were also squeezing the department stores. Between 1992 and 2004 market share of the traditional department store sector fell from nearly 6% of US retail sales to just over 3% (Figure 2 ). However, it still represented a market of $88 billion.
During the 1990s, traditional regional department stores in the USA, in particular, were left in a precarious position. Lacking sufficient scale economies to secure sizeable discounts from suppliers they typically experienced only lower single digit or negative sales growth and their stock traded at low levels. They were classic examples of companies effectively 'stuck in the middle' between larger operators, benefiting from scale-based efficiencies, and smaller operators who were more flexible and able to respond rapidly to opportunities (cf. Amatoa and Amatob, 2004) . As Michael The reaction to this predicament was predictably a round of strategic consolidation throughout the 1990s in efforts to centralise resources, take advantage of economies of scale, and focus on department store brands that could be leveraged nationwide (Table 1) .
Select firms, such as the seemingly insignificant Southern state operator Proffitt's, were at the forefront of a wave of consolidation of regional department store chains not large enough to attract the attention of the larger players. Proffitt's growth was impressive: between 1988 and mid 1998 it increased its store portfolio by 340 and its square footage by 31·6 million square feet. By 1999, revenues had increased to over $6·4 billion and culminated in the acquisition of Saks Holdings at the end of 1998 (Wood, 2002a) .
With the rapidly growing store portfolios that came from the consolidation wave, the major department store operators were faced with the task of rationalising and streamlining their organisational structures. In the past, US department stores had operated as many as 15 divisions or fascias, each with its own buying, accounting, credit and distribution facilities. The high costs that resulted made the format increasingly uncompetitive -they simply had too many decentralised divisions with too many buyers, hampered by a bureaucratic decision-making process, often lacking a central theme. In addition, and particularly in the case of larger companies, there was a lack of information flow through the retailer-supplier interface due to a dearth of coordinated systems with consequent difficulties executing key trends across divisions (see Biederman, 1991) . As a result, the 1990s was also a period of centralisation of the organisation of these larger players with the provision of shared administrative services, the concentration of buying and merchandising and the consolidation of formally autonomous divisions. Terry Lundgren, President of Federated explained the rationale for the developments:
'…we have a point of view that if the customer does not see it or feel it then it is an opportunity to be reduced or eliminated …. Every division used to have their own separate organisation -we don't need that anymore….All of our technology, all of our systems, computer operations -every division used to have their own set up for that. Now there is one state of the art organisation outside of Atlanta that services all of the systems needs for our stores. One credit facility in Ohio services all of them' (Interview 23).
The predicament in 2005
The upshot of this round of portfolio and subsequent organisational restructuring by 2005 was a highly concentrated sector dominated by a handful of operators -notably May and Federated (see Tables 2 and 3 ). However, so intense was the pressure on the department store operators that even the market leaders struggled to perform relative to market expectations. The May Company in particular saw its comparable store sales follow a largely negative trend since the late 1990s ( Figure   3 ). In an effort to achieve scale related efficiencies and access good store locations May paid £3. well suited to such an offer. Strategically, Federated is also well placed in terms of expertise at executing department store acquisitions given its previous acquisitions of Macy's and Broadway in the mid 1990s.
Retail Regulation and the US Department Store Industry
Elsewhere we and others have documented the make up of the regulatory framework impacting the US retail industry and how previous mergers and acquisitions have been dealt with by the competition authorities (Balto, 2001; Wood, 2001; Wrigley, 1992 Wrigley, , 1999 Wrigley, , 2001 Wrigley, , 2002 . We have noted how the FTC has essentially operated what might be termed a "fix-it-first" approach, agreeing not to oppose mergers and acquisitions where the acquiring firm committed itself in advance (under the spirit of the Celler Kefauver Act) to divest itself of all clear horizontal market overlaps that might be deemed to be uncompetitive at the local level. In contrast, individual State Attorney Generals, have often sought to impose far more rigorous antitrust enforcement with much stronger impacts on the nature of retail competition in particular local markets.
The continued employment of a "fix-it-first" approach by the FTC was made clear by the current Chairman of the FTC, Deborah Platt Majoras, who confirmed 'a willingness to accept fix-it-first offers from parties' (Majoras, 2004, p 8) . Previously there had been growing concerns over retailers essentially making ineffective divestitures and thereby keeping the better stores for themselves (Cotterill, 1999) which raised question marks about the approach. Nevertheless as the Director of the FTC noted:
'If the Commission concludes that a proposed settlement will remedy a merger's anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, it will likely accept that settlement and not seek to prevent (or unwind) the merger. In most situations, the [FTC] is most likely to support the parties' offer to divest an autonomous, on-going business unit that comprises at least the entire business of one of the merging parties in the relevant market, attempting to recreate the premerger competitive environment' (Simons, 2003, p 4/5) .
The execution of "fix-it-first" involves, as George Strachan of Goldman Sachs observed, the acquirer making 'some strategic decisions regarding what the likely outcome of the FTC will be'. In its turn:
'the acquirer probably makes an educated guess as to what the FTC is likely to demand and they try to accommodate the most obvious overlaps before the FTC orders them to do so. It is probably built into their plan before the FTC has even announced it' (Interview 8).
This has frequently allowed competitors to take advantage of stores divested due to overlap, though rarely on a scale that is suggested by the scale of the Federated/May merger.
Federal regulators had rarely blocked a merger in the department store industry. Partly, as an Ernst & Young analyst suggested, that is because the FTC 'are not as sensitive as they are in apparel as they are in food'. But more so, it is because the FTC historically argues that the department store sector is, in practice, not a separate market. Indeed, as a prominent former major department store CEO commented:
'I think what the FTC has historically done is smart and appropriate and that is they have looked at retail as a broader issue than just department stores. Our competitor for our business is not just another department store. …In a typical market, department stores may in the aggregate have 25% of the general merchandise, apparel and furniture [the GAF figure], so clearly 75% of the competition is not department stores -it is other forms of retail. So the FTC appropriately has looked at these from that perspective and concluded that even after the merger of two companies the share of the market they have is not counter to the beliefs of the FTC'.
However, some strong arguments were mounted for outright refusal of the merger by the FTC: The combination of Federated and May creates a $30 billion retailer accounting for approximately 70% of traditional department store sales among public companies, and approximately 30% of the mall anchor stores in the US. The combined entity also accounts for 40%-50% of the moderate to high end apparel market in the US, and 25%-50% of the sales of many of the upscale suppliers (Merrill
Lynch 2005a).
There were some precedents for regulatory action; even in the department store sector. In 1994, for example, May attempted to purchase six McCurdy's department stores in Rochester NY, to add to the four Kaufmann's stores it already owned there. An independent regional chain (Bon-Ton) with nine stores in the area protested. The FTC rejected the complaint, taking the view that the department store sector was merely part of a larger market for apparel and furniture. Undeterred, Bon-Ton took the matter to the Federal Court, and the New York Attorney General joined the case successfully convincing the judge that the department store sector was a separate market and therefore blocked the merger. However, it is notable that this example concerned a small local transaction where there was a high percentage of local market overlap and at a time when the department store sector accounted for a higher share of apparel sales than today. In contrast, the Federated/May merger did not generate high amounts of store duplication except in two or three core markets.
Outcomes: Divestiture and Market Entry for Competitors
Consistent with previous rulings, the FTC took the view that the Federated /May case represented a defensive merger driven by the continuous poor performance of the department store sector vis-à-vis alternative retail formats. In short that the reason the sector is failing is because it is not a separate and distinct market. In a document submitted to the Securities & Exchange Commission, Federated had argued:
'The retail environment is intensely competitive and department stores today compete against all retail formats. Success is contingent on our ability to realize greater economies of scale, and that is beneficial to consumers in the long run because it means more competition overall' (FDS, 2005b, p 4) . The FTC's findings mirrored the retailer's submission very closely as the regulatory body noted that a broad definition of the market must be taken as 'today's mall is itself a real competitor against traditional department stores' (FTC, 2005, p 2) and that 'conventional department stores...no longer occupy the unique position they once held, even for the more limited range of products that they sell. While department stores once were a distinctive niche market, they now face pressures both from "above" and "below" even in the same mall, not to mention mass market, mail order, and The markets of California and the North-Eastern USA were the areas of highest store overlap between the two retailers (Figure 4) . In California, Federated faced its most considerable difficulties. Having volunteered to the divestiture of 22 stores in its "fix-it-first" submission, it was forced by the State of California Attorney General to increase this by a further four outlets to take total divestiture to 26 stores. This accounts for over 4 million square feet of retail space that will be sold and approximately 5,000 jobs in this single state ( Figure 5 ). Under this agreement, when divesting stores Federated must 'give priority to Macy's and Robinsons-May traditional competitors in the department store market' thereby retaining competition levels in these catchments (Office of the Attorney General, 2005a).
Similarly, the New York Attorney General insisted upon sale of two stores in Long Island that were in addition to the initial Federated "fix-it-first" submission (Office of the Attorney General, 2005b) while the Massachusetts Attorney General insisted on one additional divestiture (see Table 4 ).
Clearly Federated was extremely accurate in forecasting the reactions of the competition authorities. (Table 5) . Clearly the geography of divestiture has the effect not only of reworking the spatial spread of the firms involved in the merger, but equally firms whose store networks are currently far removed from the areas of horizontal market overlap between the merging firms.
Implications of the Commercial Logic of the Merger
Increasing pressure on suppliers
A key argument for the merger, and not least an issue that the FTC could have used to bar it outright, are the potential implications for suppliers. While the formation of a $30bill sales department store chain does not represent an unduly high share of total US apparel sales, it represents a significant proportion of upper-end apparel sales and therefore a high proportion of the sales of suppliers such as Liz Claiborne and Ralph Lauren. Indeed Merrill Lynch (2005a) estimates that the combined entity could account for up to 50% of sales of many of the upper-end suppliers. This is evidently a level at which price discrimination could become a real possibility. However, this view was rejected as the FTC viewed department store companies competing in a broader retail market and that higher end apparel was not itself an independent product market.
Another way in which the supplier base is likely to be impacted results from the likely consolidation of the private label brands of the merged company. As widely discussed in the literature, private label offers a range of advantages to the retailer. First, the retailer has control over the offer, arrangement and development (Sayman and Raju, 2004) . Second, private labels offer the potential for margin enhancement (Porter, 1999) . Third, own label provides distinctive ranges that are unique to the firm and not available through competitor's stores. This is especially important in the department store sector as many of the difficulties with the retail format have been centred on competitors selling the same branded products at lower prices elsewhere.
Federated has put considerable effort into building a strong portfolio of private labels via its centralised support operation, Federated Merchandising Group. As with many other retailers, it offers a range of private labels that are specific to certain 'lifestyle' or age categories. The result is that Federated's penetration of private label at 17.4% of sales is significantly higher than that of May at 13%. Given that Federated has publicly stated its aim to increase private label penetration to over 20% of sales, this presents a considerable opportunity at the acquired May stores.
The power of brand over regional identity
Another major motivation for the merger is the recognition of the power of Federated lead brands:
Macy's and, to a lesser extent, Bloomingdale's. Indeed prior to the announcement of the May acquisition, Federated had already started to convert its regional department store nameplates (Bon Marche; Burdines; Rich's; Lazurus and Goldsmith's) to the Macy's brand (Table 6) there are obvious risks -not least that retailers are embedded within the community and regional nameplates are a source of local pride (Landy et al., 2005) . As a result, a sense of local disenfranchisement, felt in the short term by some customers is a key issue which the merged firm will have to sensitively negotiate -not least in Chicago where the venerated identity of Marshall Fields will be lost forever.
As the CEO of Federated recently made clear, the merger also allows Federated access to more affluent catchments currently inadequately served by the May stores.
'May Company has many locations whose demographics are higher than what their current assortments would indicate, and we believe we will add considerable value there' (FDS, 2005a, p 4).
In these more affluent catchments, Federated's strategy will be to introduce its higher end
Bloomingdale's fascia -converting less well-suited mid-market May fascias such as Hecht's or Stawbridge's 2 .
Reworking of merchandising scale
The final commercial argument for the merger centres on the fact that Federated has a superior system of buying and merchandising than May and has the potential to leverage this to the acquired stores. Similar to sophisticated food retailers such as Tesco, Federated centralises its buying yet attempts to remain sensitive to local markets by employing models of customer behaviour, affluence and catchment type (cf. Humby et al., 2003) . Indeed, much of the popular criticism of US department store retailing has focused on the lack of tailoring of the offer to local markets resulting in a 'sea of merchandise' that is available but not adequately segmented (Wileman, 1993) . As a result, much of the merger activity throughout the 1990s was centred on unleashing the potential economies of scale that exist in department store retailing, but were traditionally neglected due to a previous overly regionalised buying and operational focus (Wood, 2002a FDS, 2005a, p 7.) .
In addition to providing a lifestyle template specific to each store, MMG supplies a matrix of core vendors from which the Federated divisions are strongly encouraged to select. As Vice President of Historically the tension between local and centralised merchandising has been much more difficult to negotiate in fashion rather than food retailing owing to regional variations in demand (Wood, 2002b) . Gradually a centralised model of organisation has emerged albeit with sensitivity to local markets so as 'to enable the store management to maintain links to the buyers and strategists in head office as well as to the customers but within the structure of a very large firm' (Dawson, 2000, p 125) . It is these efficiencies that the merger has the potential to realise.
Conclusions
The Federated/May merger promises to be the last great consolidation of the US department store industry -a process that has a rich history and can be traced back to the 1920s with the construction of large ownership groups (Pasdermadjian, 1954) , into the 1980s with the period of financial restructuring (Hallsworth, 1991; Rothchild, 1991) , subsequent department store bankruptcies, followed by the round of strategic regional consolidations throughout the 1990s (Wood, 2002b) .
While the Federated/May merger has been waved through by the FTC given the strong wider competition for department store retailers, further M&A activity by these operators will not escape regulatory action at the State level. In many respects therefore, the merger represents the last great 'throw of the dice' for these formerly powerful retail giants in a consolidation vital to the survival prospects of the sector.
However, Federated faces a tall order given that it is embarking on a defensive merger with a troubled retailer currently experiencing negative like-for-like sales in a sector itself characterised by low growth. Recent academic research has noted that the lead company must pay immediate attention to remove "them and us" perspectives and encourage a shared organisational identity (Marks and Mirvis, 2001) . Therefore, the construction of a "Transition Team" containing executives from both companies has important symbolic as well as practical overtones, as does the commitment not to eliminate jobs before March 1 2006. Beyond cultural obstacles, the task to turnaround May by integrating the systems, retail fascias and customer offer remains the overarching challenge on the horizon.
The consolidation is indicative of the wider ripple effects spreading throughout the sector as retailers reassess their store portfolios in the light of the emergence of more efficient operators focusing on a handful of powerful retail brands. This has partly led to Saks Inc disposing of its Proffitt's and McRae department store divisions to Belk Inc while Neiman Marcus Group (which also owns Bergdorf Goodman) has been taken private via its purchase by two private equity groups.
These smaller transactions are likely to continue in the short term in moves, that while less extreme than the 1990s period of restructuring, are still fundamentally driven by the same imperatives of maximising returns through the realisation of operational efficiencies.
More broadly for the sector, this merger raises issues of retail regulation, market power, leveraging market scale economies, and tensions between spatial scales of buying and merchandising. The merger also has a distinct spatial logic. In turn, that triggers a geography of divestment which offers the opportunity for competitors to gain footholds in markets -in the process transforming the competitive landscape of the industry. All these we believe, are significant themes worthy of attention by retail academics with interests in corporate strategy and market regulation. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 5% 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Source: US Department of Commerce Sources: US Department of Commerce and retailer's annual reports * By the end of 2004, May was the largest department store operator given it acquisition of Marshall Field's. ** The US Dept of Commerce's definition of 'conventional and chain department stores' also includes operators such as JC Penney and Sears. Therefore, this analysis essentially underplays the concentration in the conventional department store sector if it was classified separately (which it is not). Table 3 Major Department Store Rationalisation, 1985 Rationalisation, -2004 
